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INTRODUCTION

Independent auditors are indispensable guarantors of public trust that
provide stability in financial markets, but lawsuits alleging corporate
fraud are increasingly prevalent, and complicit independent auditors
have not been left impervious to liability. Former New York State
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo recently named an independent
auditor in a lawsuit, alleging that the auditor committed fraud by
signing off on deceptive accounting methods adopted by Lehman
Brothers management. 2 A federal judge in a pending case has left an
independent auditor as a defendant along with Bear Steams in a class
action securities lawsuit, in which investors claim that the auditor stood
by while executives made misleading statements about the firm's
financial stability. 3 During 2010, investors filed 176 class action

lawsuits in federal court based on allegations of fraud,4 and as private
parties continue to file suits based on fraud and government authorities
respond and file similar suits, auditors can expect to receive subpoenas
for documents protected by the work product doctrine.
Corporations face unprecedented pressure to make disclosures to
their independent auditors in the current regulatory environment, and
they risk waiving well-established protections as they respond to

1. See STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2011) (hereinafter STAN. LAW
SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE].

2. See Peter Lattman & Susanne Craig, A Lehman Case Emerges More Than 2 Years
After Collapse, Dealbook, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/
after-ernst-young-who-may-be-next/; Bloomberg News, Ernst & Young is Added to a Lehman
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at B7. In July 2011, a federal judge in this lawsuit further
allowed claims against Lehman's independent auditors, alleging that the independent auditors
made misstatements about Lehman's compliance with accounting rules while being aware of
deceptive accounting practices used by Lehman in violation of generally accepted accounting
principles. Michael Rapoport, Suit Versus Lehman Ex-Officers Can Go On, WALL STREET
JOURNAL LAW BLOG (July 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI00014240531119048
88304576472412264685494.html.
3. See Lucas Gilmore, Suit Against Deloitte in Bear Stearns Fraud Case Won't Be
Lifted-Judge, IN AUDIT (Jan. 24, 2011), http://inaudit.com/audit/extemal-audit/suit-againstdeloitte-in-bear-steams-fraud-case-wont-be-lifted-judge-4351/.
4.

STAN. LAW SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 1.
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requests for otherwise privileged information. 5 However, corporations
that manage to convince their independent auditors to approve the filing
of misleading information may benefit from these same regulations if
courts freely grant work product immunity from discovery. Striking the
appropriate balance should reflect awareness of the possibility that an
overly broad privilege could counteract other efforts to prevent fraud.
Corporations depend on independent auditors for sound opinions on
their publicly issued financial statements. 6 To fulfill this role, auditors
are bound to request highly sensitive information from the companies
they audit. 7 On the other hand, a corporation risks waiver of significant
privileges if it discloses this sensitive information to its independent
auditor, especially if that auditor may be a potential adversary in future
litigation.8 When a company discloses documents to its independent
auditor, it waives the attorney-client privilege-this much is settled. 9
However, courts have reached divergent results when deciding whether0
these disclosures may also result in waiver of work product protection.'
As corporations continue to face the requests of their independent
auditors, these corporations are plagued by uncertainty beleaguering this
5. See generally David M. Brodsky & Julia Ann Cilia, Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: Deciding Whether to Cooperate with External Auditors and Investigating Agencies, GC
New York, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/
_pdf/pub 1102 1.pdf.
6. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(J)-(L)
(2006) (requiring audited financial statements to be filed prior to listing securities on a public or
private exchange); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2006) (conferring authority to the SEC to require
annual reports filed with the SEC to be certified by independent public accountants); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b) (2006) (conferring authority to the SEC to prescribe methods, rules, and guidelines to
be followed in the course of an audit); 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2006) (requiring audited annual
reports).
7.

See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on

Auditing Standards No. 12, § 337.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1976).
With respect to litigation, claims, and assessments, the independent auditor
should obtain audit evidence relevant to the following factors: a. [tihe existence
of a condition, situation, or a set of circumstances indicating an uncertainty as
to the possible loss to an entity arising from litigation, claims, and
assessments[;] b. [t]he period in which the underlying cause for legal action
occurred[;] c. [t]he degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome[;] d. [t]he
amount or range of potential loss.
Id.
8. For a discussion of attorney-client and work product waiver, see infra text
accompanying notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see infra text
accompanying note 70.
10. For a discussion of work product waiver and the various district court interpretations
of the doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 72-134.
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area of the law.
The work product doctrine represents a core safeguard of a lawyer's
confidential judgment in the adversarial process, stemming from deeply
entrenched policy iustifications that support continued reliance on its
broad protections. The Supreme Court established the work product
doctrine in 1942,12 and the doctrine was later partially codified in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970.13 The doctrine represents a
departure from the characteristically liberal nature of post-nineteenth
century discovery,1 4 yet it protects from discovery an essential
component of a lawyer's work-the private and personal work efforts
made "in anticipation of litigation." 15
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley)16 was enacted in
the wake of the corrupt accounting and reporting practices that led to
the demise of several multinational corporations, including Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco. 17 President George W. Bush confirmed, in
signing Sarbanes-Oxley into law, that it "adopts tough new provisions
to deter and punish corporate and accounting fraud and corruption,
ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of workers and
shareholders."' 18 Sarbanes-Oxley represents a recent movement in favor
of greater corporate transparency, notably because it reinforces the
independent auditor's role in restoring investor confidence with
11. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) ("In performing his various duties
•.. it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.").
12. See id.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
14. See James A. Pike & John W. Willis, FederalDiscovery In Operation, 7 U. CHI. L.
REV. 297, 297-303 (1939) (noting that the discovery rules as codified in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure reflect a departure from rigid pleading doctrines in favor of open discovery and
mutual disclosure); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507 ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation . . . [t]he deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of
trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise.").
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
17. See S. REP. No. 107-75, at 2-3 (2002) ("That the Enron collapse, moreover, has been
followed by a seeming flood of allegations about large-scale financial fraud at other prominent
companies, including WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, Adelphia, and Rite Aid... suggests
that there have been some basic flaws in our system of market regulation, ones that well warrant
the re-examination that the system is currently undergoing."); see also Allison Fass, One Year
Later, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES, July 22, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/
22/cz af 0722sarbanes.html (noting that the Act is widely referred to as "the broadest-sweeping
legislation to affect corporations and public accounting since the 1933 and 1934 securities
acts").
18. Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 1286 (July 30, 2002).
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thorough financial statement evaluations, 19 and also because it requires
20
management to disclose instances of fraud to its independent auditors.
Tension between the well-established work product doctrine and the
pragmatic response to recent corporate malfeasance through SarbanesOxley has left to courts the complex task of deciding whether increased
demands from new regulations wholly unravel the core safeguards of
the work product doctrine. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently
released an announcement stating that it will not assert waiver of work
product or attorney-client privilege during the course of an
However, this guidance only expresses the IRS's
examination.
probable course of action during an examination, leaving open the
possibility that the IRS would still assert waiver in litigation.
Corporate attorneys that would otherwise feel comfortable advising
clients with litigation theories under the aegis of the work product
doctrine may find this protection unexpectedly slipping away when
auditors get involved. Much of the academic discussion has focused on
whether dual-purpose documents 22 should be afforded work product
protection in the first place. 2 3 This Note instead focuses on an area
previously afforded only limited exploration-whether disclosure of
protected work product to an independent auditor amounts to waiver of
the privilege. 24 This Note further provides the first in-depth analysis of
19. Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as part
of Sarbanes-Oxley and delegated to this board the authority to oversee the audits of public
companies. 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(a) (2006). The PCAOB has since released regulations that require
auditors to remain independent throughout the course of an audit. Professional Standards R.
3520 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2007). The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) has followed suit by amending its interpretation of auditing standard AU
326; the revised interpretation states that "[t]he auditor should obtain access to the opinion,
notwithstanding potential concerns regarding attorney-client or other forms of privilege." AU §
9324, Evidential Matter: Auditing Interpretationsof Section 326, at 2.22 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 2003); see also Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as
Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007)
("Congress's main purpose in enacting SOX was not to directly improve corporate performance
but to assist the capital markets more broadly by reestablishing investor confidence through
more accurate financial reporting and better fraud avoidance.").
20. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5)(B) (2006).
21. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24, 2010).
22. For purposes of the work product doctrine, dual-purpose documents are documents
prepared for litigation that may also serve other business purposes. These purposes may include
providing support for a public company audit, or providing support for a business assessment.
23. See, e.g., Gregory Marrs, Note, The Battleground over Dual-PurposeDocuments: Is
Work ProductProtectionAppropriate Under Rule 26(B)(3)?, 11 U. ILL. L. REv. 1031 (2011);
Joy A. Williamson, Note, The Scope and Application of the Work ProductDoctrine as Applied
to Dual-PurposeDocuments, 30 VA, TAX. REv. 715 (2011).
24. See 2 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 792 (5th ed. 2007); see generally Ricardo Col6n, Caution: Disclosures of
Attorney Work Product to Independent Auditors May Waive the Privilege,52 LoY. L. REV. 115
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work product waiver in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision in
United States v. Deloitte LLP, the first decision at the federal circuit
level that directly analyzes
the waiver issue in the realm of disclosures
25
to independent auditors.
At least one commentator has argued that waiver should never occur
when documents are disclosed in the course of an audit, 26 yet auditors
do pose realistic threats as adversaries in possible litigation. On one
hand, a complete disallowance of waiver when disclosures are made to
independent auditors would unduly hinder the IRS's goals of
discovering aggressive tax positions and restoring investor confidence
through financial transparency. On the other hand, finding waiver in
every case of disclosure to an independent auditor would create
disincentives for corporate disclosure despite the prevailing public view
that corporate disclosure is generally beneficial.27 These competing
concerns thus justify a fact-based analysis of auditor involvement in
otherwise protected work product in light of the modern government
emphasis on corporate transparency through stricter auditing standards
and broader government enforcement policies.
This Note addresses the application of attorney work product
protection to materials disclosed to independent auditors and reveals
that transparency concerns mandate a case-by-case approach, rather
than a firm acceptance or rejection of waiver in this context. Part I
provides an overview of the work product doctrine and the two tests that
courts apply to determine whether dual-purpose documents qualify for
the doctrine's protection from discovery. Part II examines how
disclosure of otherwise privileged information constitutes waiver,
discusses the split of authority when courts consider whether disclosure
causes waiver in the scope of an audit (including a discussion of
Deloitte), and presents a model case to illustrate the shortcomings of the
approach taken by the majority of courts.
Part III addresses the policy arguments for and against finding
waiver in cases of disclosure to independent auditors and concludes
that, commensurate with the movement toward financial transparency
and the realistic role that auditors maintain in relation to the companies
they audit, waiver of work product protection should depend on the
circumstances of the disclosure. Finally, Part III offers a case-by-case
(2006).
25.
26.
27.

610 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir, 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010).
See generally Col6n, supra note 24.
See Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 449 (S.D.N.Y.

2004) ("[T]o construe a company's auditor as an adversary and find a blanket rule of waiver of
the applicable work product privilege . . . could very well discourage corporations from
conducting a critical self-analysis and sharing the fruits of such an inquiry with the appropriate
actors.").
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method of analysis for courts that may face this issue in the future,
whereby careful consideration of the nature of the relationship between
an independent auditor and a disclosing corporation will fairly and
comprehensively address the competing interests of the time-honored
work product protection and the modem emphasis on corporate
transparency. This approach creates consistency and maintains the
appropriate level of flexibility that will take into account the real
tensions that merit abandonment of strict work product protection in
cases of corporate disclosure to independent auditors.
I. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE: A LAWYER'S BEST FRIEND

While often treated as a privilege, the work product doctrine does
not render attorney work product completely outside the scope of
discovery, but instead provides a form of qualified immunity from
discovery. 2 8 Work product protection is essential to lawyers, primarily
because it protects the integrity of an attorney's own work efforts and
prevents this information from ending up in the hands of opposing
parties. This codified doctrine enjoys broad application to documents
and materials prepared to assist lawyers in litigation, but the protection
is far from absolute. Unfortunately, this time-honored protection still
faces uncertain application, mainly as courts apply work product tests to
determine whether documents that serve multiple purposes-beyond
strictly assisting lawyers in litigation--qualify for work product
immunity. This Part discusses the development of the work product
doctrine, as well as the work product tests commonly used to decide
whether disputed documents are afforded immunity from discovery.
A. History and Policy of the Work ProductDoctrine:From Common
Law to Codification
The attorney work product doctrine protects an attorney's thoughts,
analyses, and trial preparation from discovery, limiting access to
information in modem litigation. 9 The doctrine was established
in the
seminal Supreme Court case of Hickman v. Taylor.30 In Hickman,
28. Smith v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 582, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1996);
EPSTErN, supra note 24, at 792 (5th ed. 2007) ("The words 'doctrine,' 'immunity,' and
'privilege' (among others) have been used in naming the protection given work product. Any of
the terms is probably appropriate. Some resist use of the term 'privilege' because the protection
is qualified, unlike the traditional communications privileges. In respect to both waiver and the
exception issues, how the work-product protection will be treated is quite similar to how the
privilege is treated.").
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
30. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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counsel for the defendant sought discovery of "any oral or written
statements, records, reports, or other memoranda" from the plaintiffs
lawyer concerning the underlying dispute. 3 1 The Court acknowledged
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (newly enacted at the time of
its decision) engendered liberal discovery rules intended to disseminate
32
mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts collected by both parties.
The Court held, however, that unlimited discovery should not extend to
attorney work product because "[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery
theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental
impressions of an attorney." 33 The Court reasoned that a lawyer should
remain free to work with a certain degree of privacy
and34 without
•
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Despite
the movement toward more liberal discovery rules, the Court's decision
to protect an attorney's ideas from opposing counsel serves the vital
interest of ensuring that efficient advice is disseminated as attorneys
prepare cases for trial.35
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) partially codifies the work
product doctrine established in Hickman and states that documents are
afforded protection when: (1) they are prepared "in anticipation of
litigation or for trial," and (2) they are prepared "by or for another party
or its representative." 36 This rule applies to two categories of attorney
work product: (1) opinion work product, which is granted absolute
immunity from discovery, and (21 factual work product, which is
entitled only to qualified immunity.
Immunity from discovery of factual work product, such as witness
interviews and third party reports gathered during an attorney's
investigation, may be overcome under the rule's "substantial need
exception" if the opposing party cannot obtain its equivalent by other
means without undue hardship. In federal court, this substantial need
exception is rarely granted.3 More importantly, the substantial need
31. Id. at 499.
32. Id. at 507; see also Pike & Willis, supra note 14, at 303.
33. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510.
34. Id. at 495.
35. Id. at511.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
37. United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, No. 00-CV-737, 2004
WL 868271, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2004) (quoting Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.
1985)).
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
39. See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc. 606 F.3d 1353, 1365 (5th
Cir. 2010) ("[E]xceptions to the work product privilege are 'very rare' and exist only in
'extraordinary circumstances."'); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3) advisory committee's note
("It will be rare for a party to be able to make such a showing given the broad disclosure and
discovery otherwise allowed regarding the expert's testimony.").
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exception does not apply to opinion work product, which usually
consists of documents that contain the "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation. ' 4° Opinion work
product "is virtually undiscoverable, '4 1 and the substantial need
exception to protection over factual work product is rarely granted,
reflecting an important policy concern emphasized by the Supreme
Court in Hickman: attorneys should never be forced by the opposing
party 2to testify as to their mental opinions or conclusions related to a
4
case.

B. Work Product Tests: When Does the ProtectionApply?
When a party seeks to invoke work product immunity for audit
workpapers4 and other dual-purpose documents, 44 the analysis centers
on whether the documents were prepared "in anticipation of
litigation., 45 The circuits are split on this issue, and two main tests have
emerged to determine when documents are prepared in anticipation of
litigation and thus immune from discovery under the work product
doctrine.46 The less common test adopted by the Fifth Circuit, deemed
the "primary purpose" test, grants work product protection to
documents prepared in anticipation of litiation only if they were
prepared primarily to assist in litigation. Courts that apply this
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
41. Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
42. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
43. "Workpapers assist the accountants in formulating their opinions about the fairness of
the presentation of the financial statements of the corporation." John R. Robinson & Clyde D.
Stoltenberg, Privilege and Accountants' Workpapers, 68 A.B.A. J. 1248, 1248 (1982); see also
I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72 (July 8, 2002) (stating that tax accrual
workpapers are "tax accrual and other financial audit workpapers relating to the tax reserve for
deferred tax liabilities and to footnotes disclosing contingent tax liabilities appearing on audited
financial statements").
44. See supra note 22.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc),
cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3320 (2010) (determining whether audit workpapers were prepared "in
anticipation of litigation" in order to be eligible for work product protection); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining whether dual-purpose business
documents were prepared "in anticipation of litigation" in order to be eligible for work product
protection).
46. See Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL
2139008, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (describing the split and noting that"[c]ourts have
wrestled with the articulation of a clear test for what constitutes 'prepared in anticipation of
litigation' in the context of an IRS summons").
47. See In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2000); United
States v. El Paso, Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 23

standard find that tax accrual workpapers (prepared by lawyers to
satisfy the requirements of an audit) are created primarily to comply
with securities regulations, rather than to assist in litigation;
accordingly, these documents fail the primary purpose test and work
product protection is denied.48
The more widely adopted approach grants work product protection
to documents created "because of' the prospect of litigation.49 Under
this approach, a document does not lose immunity from discovery
"merely because it is created in order to assist with a business
decision.', 50 Work product immunity is granted more broadly under this
approach because a document may be deemed to have been prepared in
anticipation of litigation even if the primary purpose for its creation was
for a different business reason. 51 Courts that apply this standard take
52
into account the nature of the document and the facts of each case.
Under this approach, for example, most courts would hold that tax
accrual work papers developed by a lawyer to satisfy the requirements
of an audit should be afforded work product protection. But this
outcome is not guaranteed.
In a recent case, United States v. Textron Inc., 3 the First Circuit
1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[L]itigation need not be imminent ...as long as the primary
motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future
litigation.").
48. See, e.g., El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543-44 (holding that a "tax pool analysis" (a document
similar to a tax accrual workpaper) created by a corporation's outside counsel does not qualify
for work product protection under the "primary purpose" test because, while it does summarize
theories about possible litigation, "such analyses are not designed to prepare a specific case for
trial or negotiation").
49. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (referring to the
"because of' test as the standard adopted by most circuits when deciding whether documents
were created in anticipation of litigation).
50. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). Eight other circuits
also use the "because of' test for work product. See, e.g., Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 137; Sandra T.E.
v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Professionals Direct Ins.
Co., 578 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir.
2004); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2002); Maine
v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002); Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel,
983 F.2d 1252, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967
F.2d 980,984 (4th Cir. 1992).
51. Parties anticipate litigation when, "in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation of the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation." Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 137 (quoting In re Sealed
Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARcus, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024, at

343 (3d ed. 2010).
52. See, e.g., Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 139 (remanding the issue for in camera review to
determine whether tax accrual work papers were created "because of' the prospect of litigation).
53. 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3320 (2010).
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applied the "because of' test to tax accrual workpapers prepared with
the involvement of tax lawyers, but ultimately determined that the
workpapers were created solely to meet financial disclosure
requirements. 54 Therefore, the court held that the ancillary purpose of
providing litigation predictions did not merit work product protection
over the workpapers.55 This interpretation was criticized by two
dissenting judges and several commentators as an improper application
of the traditional "because of' test.56 The commentators criticized the
majority's interpretation of the "because of' test and expressed concern
that the decision leaves little guidance to lower courts,
57 compounding the
uncertainty already inherent in this area of the law.
Although most circuits now apply the "because of' test, Textron
demonstrates that, in the realm of dual-purpose business documents, the
law remains in flux. Once the majority in Textron held that the
workpapers were not protected work product, it did not need to
determine whether the disclosure to the independent auditor waived
work product immunity. 58 Increasingly, though, courts have been forced
to focus on whether disclosure of work product to third parties waives
work product immunity. 59 Plaintiffs often claim that a corporation
waived work product immunity over otherwise protected work product
by disclosing documents to its independent auditor.6 ° When waiver is at
issue, a court must first decide whether disputed material is protected
work product before it can decide whether disclosure waived the
privilege that attached to the underlying material. 61 The uncertainty
lingering over this preliminary determination (application of the work
product tests) may complicate the subsequent analysis of work product
waiver, 62 although these two determinations should remain analytically
distinct because work product waiver, as will be
63 discussed in the
concerns.
policy
different
addresses
Part,
following
54.

Id. at 30-31.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see generally Jacob A. Kling, Tax Cases Make
Bad Work Product Law: The Discoverability of LitigationRisk Assessments After United States
v. Textron, 119 YALE L.J. 1715 (2010); Sarah Seifert Mallett, Work Product Doctrine-The
First Circuit Further Confuses an Existing Circuit Split in United States v. Textron Inc., 63

SMU L. REV. 251 (2010).
57. See generallyKling, supra note 56; Mallett, supra note 56.
58.

See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30-31.

59. See infra Part II.
60. Id.
61. See Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 444-45
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
62. See, e.g., id. at 447 n.9 (finding that its "common interests" view of work product
waiver stems from the more expansive "because of' test used to determine whether the disputed
material is protected work product in the first place).
63. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem inherent in mixing the preliminary
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II. WORK PRODUCT WAIVER: A LAWYER'S NEMESIS
The previous Part introduced the core safeguards and policy
underlying the work product doctrine, and demonstrated the two main
tests utilized by federal courts to determine whether documents
prepared by an attorney fall under its protections. This Part discusses
whether courts continue to protect attorney work product from
discovery once underlying material that is deemed protected work
product is disclosed to third parties. This Part introduces the application
of work product waiver to disclosures between corporations and third
party independent auditors, highlights the split of authority at the district
court level, and describes the problems created by the first federal
circuit level decision to squarely address this issue.
A. Work Product Waiver andIndependent Auditors
Waiver of work product protection has developed entirely through
case law, as it is not addressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
where the work product doctrine is codified.64 The work product
doctrine has close ties to the attorney-client privilege as both keep
certain information from adversaries to ensure that lawyers provide
adequate representation. 65 But the principles address different
concerns.
The attorney-client privilege encourages complete and candid
communication between clients and their attorneys. 67 The work product
doctrine encourages thorough preparation for trial because it protects an
attorney's work efforts from discovery by opposing parties. 68 Almost all
disclosures to third parties vitiate the attorney-client privilege's core
protection of confidentiality, yet some disclosures are entirely consistent
with the work product doctrine. 69 Accordingly, federal courts have
consistently found that the attorney-client privilege is waived when a

anticipation of litigation test with subsequent work product waiver analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 236-37.
64. See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 683-84 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting that the issue of waiver by disclosure must be decided according to common law
principles because it is not governed by any federal constitutional provision, federal statute, or
rule established by the Supreme Court); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239
(1975) ("The privilege derived from the work product doctrine is not absolute. Like other
qualified privileges, it may be waived.").
65. See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 791.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1027.
69. Id.
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70
corporation discloses documents to independent auditors.
Nevertheless, corporations may successfully assert work product
immunity even after the attorney-client privilege is deemed to have
been waived, although some courts have
found that disclosure to
71
immunity.
product
work
waives
auditors
Work product waiver occurs when otherwise protected work product
is disclosed to a potential adversary or a conduit to a potential
adversary. 72 Variations of this rule exist, but each essentially holds that
work product immunity is waived when otherwise protected work
product is disclosed in a manner that is inconsistent with keeping it
from adversaries.73 This emanates from the policy first espoused in
Hickman: "[t]he purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect
information against opposing parties, rather than against all others
outside a particular confidential
relationship, in order to encourage
' 74
effective trial preparation. ,
During litigation, the work product waiver issue arises frequently
when corporations disclose confidential business documents to
independent auditors as part of routine and required audits. 75 Companies
frequently share attorney work product with their independent

70. Gramm v. Horsehead Indus., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 5122, 1990 WL 142404, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that courts generally find waiver of the attorney-client privilege when
otherwise privileged documents are disclosed to accountants).
71. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
that work product immunity is different from and sometimes broader than the attorney-client
privilege); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that
most decisions are uniform in "implying that work product protection is not as easily waived as
the attorney-client privilege").
72. See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 687 ("[D]isclosure to an adversary, real or
potential, forfeits work product protection."). Eight other circuits also use this standard. See,
e.g., Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2010); In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d
1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2006); John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003);
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 306-07 (6th Cir.
2002); Montgomery Cnty. v. MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1999); Pittman v.
Frazer, 129 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir. 1997); Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122
F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624-26 (4th Cir.
1988); Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 647 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1978).
73. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 687; see also Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny
Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that work product immunity is
waived when material is disclosed in a manner that "substantially increases the opportunity for
potential adversaries to obtain the information"); Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 140 (holding that work
product immunity is waived when material is disclosed in a manner that "is inconsistent with the
maintenance of secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary").
74. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
75. See Paul A. Straus & Paul B. Maslo, Protectionof Work Product Shared with Outside
Auditors, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 2010, Outside Counsel § 4.
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auditors.76 In the course of an audit, independent auditors often request
summaries of pending or ongoing litigation, minutes of meetings of
special litigation committees, internal investigation reports, and tax
opinions.77 The few state courts that have addressed this issue have
reached conflicting results when deciding whether work product
protection is waived when work product is disclosed to independent
auditors, although most have found that disclosure does not waive the
protection. 78
One commentator has argued that voluntariness is a critical factor
that courts fail to consider.79 He concludes that disclosures to
independent auditors may not be "voluntary" due to the demands of
auditing standards
and the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
regulatory
8°
environment. However, in United States v. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed the
argument that disclosure by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) to a government audit agency was involuntary. 8 1 The court stated
that "MIT's disclosure to the audit agency resulted from its own
voluntary choice, even if that choice was made at the time it became a
defense contractor
and subjected itself to the alleged obligation of
82
disclosure."
Even after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, which created
increased disclosure requirements for corporations, courts have declined
to examine whether disclosures to independent auditors are voluntary.
Moreover, the recently enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502 states that
when work product is disclosed "in a federal proceeding" or "to a
federal office or agency," the disclosure does not amount to waiver. 83
Due to this new rule, disclosures to independent auditors likely do not
amount to involuntary disclosures because this is generally
confined to
84
disclosures imposed directly by government agencies.
A defending party may still argue that disclosure was not voluntary,
but a corporation is subject to independent auditor requests only when it
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. CompareLaguna Beach Cnty. Water Dist. v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 387, 388 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that work product protection was
not waived when letters containing work product were sent to auditors), with In re Rules of
Prof 1 Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 820-21 (Mont.
2000) (holding that disclosures to third-party auditors can be adversaries, but waiver of the work
product privilege, associated with these disclosures, depends on the facts and circumstances).
79. See Col6n, supra note 24, at 136.
80. Id.
81. 129 F.3d 681,686 (lst Cir. 1997).
82. Id.
83. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
84.

See id.
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voluntarily decides to offer its shares in a public exchange." This is
similar to MIT's choice to become a government contractor, which the
court in United States v. MassachusettsInstitute of Technology found to
be a voluntary decision, although it would inevitably cause MIT to be
subject to disclosure requests by government auditors.8 6 Accordingly, in
cases of disclosures made to independent auditors, courts assume that
the disclosures were made voluntarily. Although these requests are
often compelled by securities laws and accounting regulations, 87 these
constraints instead factor into whether relationships between corporate
clients and their independent auditors can be considered "adversarial." 88
When courts must decide whether a particular disclosure increases
the likelihood that an adversary may obtain the information, many
consider whether the disclosing party and the third party share common
interests. 89 Parties that do not share common interests are generally
considered actual or potential adversaries, in which case a disclosure
between such parties waives work product protection.9" Outcomes
therefore depend on a balancing of competing policy concerns as courts
attempt to define the roles of independent auditors.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. long ago
characterized independent auditors as "public watchdogs," so finding
that disclosure waived work product protection in these cases supports
the idea that independent auditors are "adversarial" in relation to their
clients because independent auditors owe their ultimate allegiance to the
public. 91 But finding that disclosure caused waiver of the protection
may discourage full communication between independent auditors and
their clients, which ultimately benefits the public because independent
auditors take disclosed information into account as they issue opinions
on publicly issued financial statements. Finding that disclosure does not
waive work product protection fosters this communication, but at the
expense of a limited ability to discover corporate fraud. Moreover,
extending work product protection when work product is disclosed to
independent auditors also usurps the intended limits of the work product
privilege when auditors can become "adversaries." When courts must
decide whether independent auditors should be considered adversaries
85. In contrast, disclosure is not voluntary, for example, when the material is seized
pursuant to a search warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 783 (10th Cir. 2008).
86. 129 F.3d at 686.
87. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 16.
88.

See infra Part II.A.-B.

89. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
90. Id. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("The existence of common interests between transferor and transferee is relevant to deciding
whether the disclosure is consistent with the nature of the work product privilege.").
91. 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
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or conduits to potential adversaries in relation to their clients, the crux
of the discussion depends on determining the proper role of an auditor,
and federal courts have reached mixed results.9
B. The DistrictCourt Split ofAuthority
One line of cases holds that disclosure to independent auditors does
not waive work product protection, and In re Pfizer Inc. Securities
Litigation93 is often cited for this proposition. In Pfizer, the defendant
disclosed to its auditor several legal documents that discussed potential
liability related to its sale of defective mechanical heart valves.9 4 The
plaintiffs sought production of the documents, claiming that disclosure
to the auditors waived work product protection. 95 In Pfizer, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York recognized that
one of the principles of Hickman was to prevent potential adversaries
from having the opportunity to obtain opposing counsel's work
product.96 Accordingly, the Pfizer court applied the prevailing view that
a disclosure of work product to a third party waives work product
protection if it substantially increases the likelihood that the information
will be revealed to adversaries. 97 However the court offered only
conclusory reasoning to support its decision. 99 The court broadly stated
that the independent auditor and the corporation "obviously shared
common interests," without specifically mentioning what interests were
involved and without closely scrutinizing the precise role of the
independent auditor. 99
In Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., °° the same court
articulated a different view. The court in Medinol held that work
product protection was waived as a result of disclosure to an
independent auditor, emphasizing the role of the independent auditor as
a "'public watchdog."' l In Medinol, the defendant was accused of
92. Compare Merrill Lynch, 229 F.R.D. at 447-48 (conceding that an auditor does not
share a common litigation interest with its corporate client, but holding that an auditor's
independent role does not create an adversarial relationship), with Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that auditors must not share
common interests with their clients because their independent status mandates an adversarial
relationship).
93. No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS),1993 WL 561125 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993).
94. Id.at *2-3.
95. Id. at *3, *6.
96. Id.
at *6.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
101. Id.
at 116-17.
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abusing its position as licensee following its distribution of heart and
arterial implants. 1°2 As part of an internal investigation, the defendant
compiled the minutes of a meeting conducted by the Special Litigation
Committee of its Board of Directors and showed these minutes to its
independent auditors as part of an audit of the company's litigation
exposure. 10 3 The plaintiff sought production of these minutes and
claimed that the defendant waived work product protection when it
disclosed the minutes to its independent auditors.10 The court agreed
waived work product
and held that the disclosure by the10 defendant
5
immunity over the disclosed minutes.
The court found that regulatory requirements pressure independent
auditors to actively seek the evaluations of litigation exposures
conducted by a company's counsel, and an auditor must then "come 0to6
his own understanding of reasonableness, based on the evidence."'
Accordingly, an auditor's review must reflect that auditor's independent
opinion about the fairness of the financial statements, and may not
necessarily be aligned with the interests of the audited company. 07 The
court also recognized that, in light of recent accounting scandals and
increased government pressure on independent auditors to properly
make a fair evaluation of a company's financial disclosures, auditors
"must not share common interests with the compan[ies] they audit"
because "[g]ood auditing requires adversarial tension between the
auditor and the client.' 0 More specifically, the court found that the
particular disclosure did not further any litigation purpose. 109 When
there is no "common interest" in litigation served by the disclosure,
extending work product protection does not serve the privacy interests
that the doctrine was intended to protect." 0
This issue was heard by the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York yet again, but this time the court sided with its
previous holding in Pfizer, departing from Medinol.ll' In Merrill Lynch
& Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., the court held that a blanket rule of
waiver should not be found in every case of disclosure to independent

102. Id.at 114.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.at 115.
106. Id.at 115-16.
107. Id.at 116.

108.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roberta S. Karmel, A New Watchdog for Public

Accountants,N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 2002, at 3).

109.

Id.

110.

Id.at 117.

111. See generally Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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auditors and that the result depends on the facts of each case. 1 2 The
court weighed in on the types of common interests contemplated by the
work product doctrine and whether a corporation and its independent
3 The court noted that an auditor and
auditors share any such interests. 11
a client do not share common litigation interests, but then held that this
was not essential. 114 The court then moved on to what it called the
"critical inquiry": whether the auditor could be a potential adversary or
a conduit to a potential adversary. 115
The court in Merrill Lynch acknowledged that Sarbanes-Oxley
strengthens the independent role that auditors assume in relation to their
corporate clients, yet it found in this particular case that there was no
adversarial relationship." 6 The court affirmed that the aim of auditor
independence and regulatory reform should be to encourage full and
frank disclosures by corporations to their independent auditors, which
would ultimately make more accurate information available to the
investing public. 17 The court also implied that finding waiver for
disclosures to independent auditors might deter the auditors from
inquiring too closely into corporate wrongdoing. 118 Ultimately, the
court's holding came down to a balance of competing policy concerns.
On one hand, the work product doctrine should be appropriately limited
as a narrow exception to litigants' perceived right to "every man's
evidence." 119 On the other hand, courts should promote complete
disclosure by clients to their auditors. 120 The interest of promoting
disclosures won, at the expense of encroachment on the limits of the
work product doctrine, and the privilege was protected despite
disclosure to a third party independent auditor.21
The Second Circuit's ruling in United States v. Adlman, 22 decided
after Pfizer but before Medinol, provides further support for the nonwaiver line of cases. In Ad/man, the Second Circuit addressed whether a
study prepared for an attorney that assessed the results of litigation
should be eligible for work product protection. 123 The court held that the
"because of' test was applicable and remanded the case back to the
district court with instructions to apply the test to determine whether the
112. Id.at449.
113. Id.at447.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.at449.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.(quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).
123. Id.at 1195-96.
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study merited
work three
product
protection.12 4a As part
the in
court's
each
ons, of
finding
hypothection.
reasoning,
it included
that work product protection would be granted. 2 5 One of those fact
patterns involved a request by an independent auditor for legal
strategies prepared by a company's attorney.1 26 This analysis was later
cited by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
American Steamship, Inc. v. Alcoa Steamship, Inc. 127 to support its
departure from Medinol, as the court in American Steamship concluded
28 waived when the material was
immunity was not
that worktoproduct
disclosed an independent auditor
Most recently though, another district court within the jurisdiction of
the Second Circuit sided with Medinol, departing from the stronger
trend established by Pfizer, MerrillLynch, and Adlman. In UnitedStates
v. Hatfield,129 the court found that disputed consulting documents were
not protected work product in the first place.' 3 0 However, the court went
further and stated that, even if the documents had been protected work
product, the protection would have been waived because the documents
were disclosed to an independent auditor.' 3 1 The court noted that a party
asserting work product protection over disputed material must show that
to ensure the disclosed material would
it took "reasonable precautions"
32
remain confidential.1
The court again focused on the role of the auditor as a "public
watchdog" and found that the possibility always existed that the
independent auditor's investigation could reveal that the disclosing
party acted fraudulently or negligently. 33 Accoraltthding waiver
is appropriate because "[s]haring potentiall y inculpatory information
with an entity dedicated to uncovering financial irregularities is entirely
inconsistent with the
34 'zone of privacy' that 'underlie[s] the work
product doctrine.""1
These competing concerns were finally directly addressed by a
federal circuit court in United States v. Deloitte LLP, in which the D.C.
Circuit held that the disclosure of otherwise protected documents to an
124. Id. at 1198.
125.

Id.at 1198-1200.

126. Id. at 1200.
127o.
04 Civ. 4309 LAKJCF, 2006 WL 278131 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,2006).
128. d. at * -2. 4
129.
130.
131.
132.

No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2010 WL 183522 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2010).
1d. at *2.
ld. at*4.
Id. at *3 (quoting In re National Gas Commodity Litig., 229 F.R.D. 82, 87 (S.D.N.Y.

2005)).

133.
2002)).
134.

Id. (quoting Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at *4 (quoting Medinol, 214 F.R.D. at 114-15).
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independent auditor did not amount to work product waiver. 135
C. The Deloitte Decision
Besides appearing in the Ad/man decision handed down by the
Second Circuit, the issue of work product waiver, as a result of
disclosure to an independent auditor, only recently reached the federal
circuit level in Deloitte. In Deloitte, the D.C. Circuit sided with the line
of cases that find non-waiver, outlined in Part II.B. 1 36 The decision is
important to the analysis of work product waiver because it is the latest
decision supporting a clear trend in the interpretation of the work
product doctrine, and because it establishes a new and overly narrow
standard used to determine whether an auditor can be a potential
adversary.
In Deloitte, Dow challenged IRS tax adjustments to the tax returns of
two partnerships owned by Dow. 137 The government subpoenaed
Deloitte-Dow's independent auditor-and sought production of files
associated with Deloitte's audit of reserves that Dow maintained in case
the IRS imposed higher taxes. 138 Deloitte refused to produce three
documents based upon Dow's assertion that the documents were
protected under the work product doctrine. 1 39 The government then filed
a motion to compel Deloitte to produce 40
the documents in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia.' 1
The first disputed document (the "Deloitte Memorandum") was a
draft memorandum prepared by Deloitte that discussed a meeting
between Deloitte employees, Dow employees, and Dow's outside
counsel concerning the possibility of litigation over the tax treatment of
a partnership, and the need to account for this possibility in the course
of an audit. r41 The second document was a flow chart and memorandum
created by a Dow accountant and an in-house attorney. 142 The third

135. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130
S.Ct. 3320 (2010). The issue of work product waiver was raised in the district court holding of
Textron, which was later reviewed en banc by the First Circuit. See United States v. Textron
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152 (D.R.I. 2007); see generally United States v. Textron Inc., 577
F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010). However, the issue of
waiver was not appealed, and the First Circuit did not rule on the matter in its en banc opinion.
Id.at 25.
136. Deloitte, 610 F.3d. at 133.
137.

Id.

138. Id.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

KEEP YOUR FRIENDSCLOSE BUT YOUR AUDITORS CLOSER

document was a tax opinion prepared by Dow's outside counsel. 14 3 The
government acknowledged that the latter two documents, referred to as
the "Dow Documents," contained protected work product.'44
The court held that, although the Deloitte Memorandum was
prepared by an auditor, it was protected work product because the
145
doctrine focuses on the content of the material, not on the preparer.
Because the document contained material that reflected the ideas of
Dow's counsel, the entire memorandum was sent back to the district
court for in camera' 46 review to determine which parts, if any, contained
protected work product material. 147 More importantly, the court applied
the broader "because of" test, and by focusing on the document's
contents rather than its function, the court held that the material in the
documents could have been generated "in anticipation of litigation"
148
even if it could have also been used for ordinary business purposes.
According to the court, as long as the material "was prepared because of
the prospect of litigation," it should be afforded work product
the additional function of satisfying
protection-even though it served
49
1
audit.
an
of
the requirements
Although the government conceded that the Dow Documents
contained protected work product, the government argued that work
product immunity was waived when these documents were disclosed to
Deloitte. 150 The court adopted the prevailing standard that results in
waiver if disclosure is "inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy
from the disclosing party's adversary."'151 Accordingly, work product
privilege is waived if work product is voluntarily disclosed to a
potential adversary or a conduit to an adversary. 52
1. Deloitte as a Potential Adversary
The court held that Deloitte was not a potential adversary of Dow,
stating that the mere possibility that a dispute could arise between a
company and its auditor was not sufficient to hold that an independent
auditor is a potential adversary for the purposes of work product
143.
144.
145.

146.
BLACK'S
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.at 136.

In camera inspection involves "a trial judge's private consideration of evidence."
LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009).
Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 139.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.at 139.

151. Id.at 140 (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605
(D.C. Cir. 2001)),
152. Id.
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waiver.1 53 The court first described professional standards of conduct
that require auditor independence and concluded that these standards
show that any actual or threatened litigation would compromise
independence and require withdrawal from the audit.' 54 The court then
asserted that "'an auditor's need to scrutinize and investigate a
corporation's records and book-keeping practices simply is not the
relationship contemplated by the work
equivalent of an adversarial
55
product doctrine.""
In accordance with Merrill Lynch, this language suggests that
independent auditors are not inherently potential adversaries of their
clients despite their roles as corporate financial statement examiners that
serve the interests of public transparency. 156 Therefore, an automatic
rule of waiver in every case of disclosure to an independent auditor
would not make sense because the work product doctrine would cease
prepared by attorneys and disclosed to
to protect any documents
57
independent auditors.1
The court's focus-to determine whether Deloitte was a potential
adversary--depended upon a factual analysis of "whether Deloitte
could be Dow's adversary in the sort of litigation the Dow Documents
address."' 158 The court found that Dow could not be an adversary in
litigation over what was contained in the Dow Documents because Dow
anticipated a dispute with the IRS, not with Deloitte. 159 Furthermore, the
tax implications contained in the Dow Documents would probably not
be relevant to any possible litigation between Dow and Deloitte.160
This standard articulated by the court narrows the definition of
"adversary" for work product purposes to cover only a situation where
an auditor could be an adversary in the sort of litigation that the
disputed documents address. 16 1 Under this limitation, a court may find
that an auditor can only be an adversary if that auditor has a personal
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 138. See AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Code of Professional Conduct §
101.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005) (describing the effect of actual and
threatened litigation on auditor independence).
155. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 138 (quoting Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc.,
229 F.R.D. 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
156. See MerrillLynch, 229 F.R.D. at 449 (ruling against a blanket rule of waiver of the
work product privilege in the case of disclosures to independent auditors).
157. See Michelle M. Henkel, Textron: The Debate Continues as to Whether Auditor
TransparencyWaives the Work ProductPrivilege, 50 TAx MGM'T MEMO. 251, 263 (2009) ("[I]f

the mere chance of a subsequent disclosure were enough for waiver, the work product privilege
would be eviscerated."); see generally Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).

158.

Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 140.

159.

Id.

160.
161.

Id.
Id.
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stake in the underlying material addressed in the document. But unless
an auditor has violated its professional qualifications or is practicing
fraudulently as a CPA, no auditor should have a stake in the audited
company's underlying
transactions due to the rules of auditor
62
independence.'

This standard might be met-amounting to a waiver of the work
product protection-if corporate documents disclosed to an auditor
fairly anticipate a dispute with the auditing firm over its services
unrelated to the audit. A large accounting firm may provide both tax and
audit services to the same client; conflict-of-interest rules prevent an
independent auditor from issuing an opinion on the financial statements
of a current litigation adversary, but the auditing firm could become an
adversary due to the involvement of its tax arm.163 Tax advice can be
provided by the same firm that conducts the audit, subject to limitations
64
instituted by Sarbanes-Oxley that mandate audit committee approval. 1
One can imagine that documents incorporating the work of the
auditing firm's tax arm might be disclosed as part of a routine audit to
determine the accuracy of contingency reserves.' 65 Subsequently, a tax
position addressed in a document that contains work product may
become the central issue in litigation between a client and its auditing
firm if, for example, the tax advisors were involved in a scheme of
criminal tax avoidance. If the auditors failed to scrutinize these
estimates in violation of accounting regulations, this would make an
even stronger case for waiver of the privilege under this standard
because the client and the auditor could conceivably become litigation
adversaries over this auditing failure.
The result is that an auditor becomes an anticipated adversary of the
client over an issue that directly relates to material produced with the
involvement of the auditor's tax arm. If this material specifically
relating to a possible dispute with the auditor's firm were then disclosed
to the auditor in the course of an audit, this situation would meet the
162.

See Professional Standards R. 3520 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Rd. 2007)

(requiring auditors to remain independent throughout the course of an audit); AU § 101, 10 1-1
Interpretationof Rule 101, at .02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002) (describing
various situations that would impair auditor independence).
163. See AU § 101, 101-6 Interpretationof Rule 101, at .08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2002) (describing the effect of actual or threatened litigation on independence).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(h) (2006) ("A registered public accounting firm may engage in any
non-audit service, including tax services ... only if the activity is approved in advance by the
audit committee of the issuer.").
165. See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5,
1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) ("[A] contingency is defined as an existing condition,
situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain (hereinafter a 'gain

contingency') or loss (hereinafter a 'loss contingency') to an enterprise that will ultimately be
resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.").
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narrow standard established in Deloitte. But even if the auditors were
not involved in any wrongdoing, because the auditing firm's tax arm
was involved in criminal tax avoidance and documents discussing this
were disclosed to the auditors, under the Deloitte standard, the auditing
firm became an anticipated adversary of the client over an issue that
directly relates to possible litigation with the firm, and work product
protection would be waived.
Alternatively, this standard would not likely be met-work product
protection would not be waived-in the model case posed in Part II.D
of this Note. In the model case, the auditor was complicit in fraud, but
the underlying documents did not address this possibility. 166 Under
Deloitte's narrow standard, disclosure would not amount to waiver
where the auditor was complicit in fraud because the disclosed
documents do not address potential litigation between the auditor and its
client. Under the same standard, however, disclosure to an auditor that
did not act fraudulently, but that handled documents discussing
litigation between the client and its tax arm, would have amounted to a
waiver of the work product protection.
The standard for determining a "potential adversary" articulated in
Deloitte is thus unclear and risks narrow interpretation by lower courts.
Corporations, attorneys, and auditors are left wondering whether an
auditor may ever become an "adversary" under Deloitte's standard in
the event that the auditor may be criminally liable for fraudulent
practices related to the analysis of a document (for example, a knowing
failure to apply GAAS or follow GAAP), even if the fraud is not related
to a stake in the underlying substance of that document. In effect, the
court in Deloitte followed the reasoning of Merrill Lynch but went a
step further and established a standard that will almost always be
satisfied when auditors receive otherwise privileged information from
their clients, without accounting for circumstances in which auditors act
fraudulently through coordinated use of disclosed work product.
2. Deloitte as a Conduit to Dow's Adversaries
After the court held that Deloitte was not an adversary, the
government then argued that Deloitte was a conduit to Dow's
adversaries and that Dow's disclosure waived the work product
privilege. 61' The court identified two factors that tend to indicate that a
party is a conduit to an "adversary": (1) the extent to which a disclosing
party engaged in "selective disclosure," and (2) the extent to which a
disclosing party had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.168 If a
166.
167.
168.

See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
United States v. Deloitte, 610 F.3d 129, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id.
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close analysis of either of these factors shows that a disclosure was
inconsistent with "maintenance of secrecy" from adversaries, then the
19
court should find that the work product privilege was waived.
"Selective disclosure" occurs when a disclosing partz reveals its
work product to some adversaries, but not to others.' 0 The court
succinctly found that "selective disclosure" did not occur because
Deloitte was not an "adversary" in the first place.' 7 1 The court then
noted that Dow and Deloitte did not share common litigation or other
interests in the disclosed documents, but that a reasonable expectation
of confidentiality can prevent work product privilege from being
waived. 172 Accordingly, the court closely focused on the second factor
and sought to determine whether Dow had a reasonable expectation of
to Deloitte.
confidentiality when it disclosed the documents
Despite the government's argument that there are many possible
ways in which an independent auditor could reveal the information
contained in the document, the court found that "Dow had a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality because Deloitte, as an independent
auditor, has an obligation to refrain from disclosing confidential client
information" according to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants' (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct. 1 74 Therefore, in
the court's view, Dow had a reasonable expectation that Deloitte would
not disclose its confidential information, leading the court to hold that
the disclosure of the75Dow Documents did not amount to waiver of work
product protection.'
To this point, this Part has outlined the common law doctrine of
work product waiver and presented the split of authority that has
predominated primarily within district courts within the jurisdiction of
the Second Circuit. In Deloitte, the D.C. Circuit became the first circuit
court to directly address the issue, and it appropriately followed the
majority of cases that found that disclosures to independent auditors did
not waive work product protection. Deloitte and the other non-waiver
decisions produced proper outcomes under the particular facts of each
respective case, but failed to adequately consider all of the policy
concerns that would permit future courts to properly address true
adversarial relationships-notably those that would arise from
169. Id.
170. Id. at 142.
171. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 153-69 for a discussion of the standard
articulated in Deloitte for determining whether a party is an "adversary" for work product
purposes.
172. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 142.
173. Id.
174. See id.; see also AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Code of Professional Conduct §
301.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005).
175. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 142.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 23

coordination in fraudulent practices-between auditors and their
corporate clients. The following model case presents a set of facts that
tests the limit of Deloitte's narrow standard.
D. The Model Case

176

Imagine a large pharmaceutical company, Safe Medicine, Inc.
(SMI), which employs Linda Brown, a products liability attorney, to
regularly review the prospects of ongoing litigation related to various
over-the-counter drugs sold by SMI in the United States. Several users
of SMI's new migraine pain relief drug sue the company and claim that
the drug caused them to experience sudden and debilitating chest pains.
SMI's managers ask Brown to conduct an investigation and ultimately
draft a report, analyzing the possible success of these claims and
estimating the amount that SMI might expect to pay in damages. Brown
drafts a report that estimates only a slim chance that the lawsuits may
result in large payouts by SMI to successful plaintiffs. SMI managers
then use this report to maintain adequate reserves to cover financial
losses from tort claims. These reserves, along with notice of the
pendency of the ongoing lawsuits, are reflected1 77on SMI's publicly
issued financial statements as contingent liabilities.
During the annual audit of the company's financial statements, and
upon the request of its independent auditors, SMI's managers provide
the auditors with copies of Brown's reports. The independent auditors
compare these reports with SMI's contingent liabilities reported on its
publicly issued financial statements and ultimately issue an unqualified
audit opinion for SMI, which states that the company's financial
statements are fairly presented in accordance with applicable securities
laws and accounting regulations.
Subsequently, SMI loses a series of tort claims brought by plaintiffs
176. This model case draws from several cases and situations in which otherwise protected
work product is disclosed to an independent auditor. See, e.g., id. at 133; Merrill Lynch & Co. v.
Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 WL 561125, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993); Bloomberg News,
Ernst & Young Is Added to a Lehman Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at B7; see generally
Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Col6n, supra note
24. The model is tailored to facilitate analytical clarity throughout this Note by addressing, in
particular, the possibility of complicit auditor involvement in corporate fraud.
177. Contingent liabilities are obligations that depend on the outcome of a future uncertain
event, such as a court case. See ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 5, 33 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) (listing three factors to be
considered when determining whether disclosure is required with respect to possible claims and
assessments: (1) "[t]he period in which the underlying cause" of the assessment occurred, (2)
"[t]he degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome," and (3) "[tlhe ability to make a
reasonable estimate of the amount of loss").
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that suffered debilitating side effects after using SMI's new migraine
pain relief drug, and the company becomes liable for damages well in
excess of its estimated reserves. When news spreads, the company's
stock price plummets 178 and investors file a class action lawsuit for lost
profits, claiming that SMI's managers improperly underreported their
reserves for contingent liabilities in violation of securities laws. The
investors also claim that the underreported liabilities allowed SMI to
report inflated earnings that misled investors. The investors include the
independent auditors as defendants, claiming that they failed to properly
follow auditing standards during their audit of SMI's financial
statements. The investors then issue a subpoena to the auditors
requesting copies of the reports drafted by Brown.
When the independent auditors decline to disclose Brown's reports
and assert work product protection 79 to prevent this material from
becoming available to the investors in discovery, the investors claim
because the reports were disclosed to
that SMI waived such protection
180
the independent auditors.
This model case presents the very likely possibility that an auditor
may be sued for acting in concert with corporate fraud committed by
upper management 18 1 and demonstrates that the majority approach to
work product waiver analysis outlined in this Part is inadequate to
address concerns that implicate independent auditors in this sort of
fraudulent behavior. The next Part will examine the shortcomings of
current approaches to work product waiver analysis in accordance with
the model case posed here, offer a more thorough case-by-case method
of analysis, and in the alternative offer a bright-line comprehensive fix
to the uncertainty compounded by the narrow standard established in
Deloitte.
III. FLEXIBILITY PERSISTS AND SOUND POLICY PREVAILS: A
SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ACCOUNT FOR REALISTIC TENSIONS AND
COPE WITH AN UNCERTAIN PROTECTION

Because most courts that faced the issue of work product waiver
178. Cf Aaron Smith, Merck Stock Tumbles After Vioxx Verdict, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr.
6, 2006, 5:45 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/O4/06/news/companies/merckoutlook/index.
htm.
179. The work product doctrine, while often treated as a privilege, more precisely provides
a form of qualified immunity from discovery. See supra text accompanying note 28. In this
Note, the terms "doctrine." "privilege," "immunity," and "protection" are used interchangeably,
although these variations all refer to the work product doctrine.
180. Cf In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 WL 561125 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 23, 1993).
181. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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from disclosure to auditors decided not to closely analyze whether the
disclosures were voluntary, the analysis instead has focused on whether
the disclosure substantially increases the chance that a possible
adversary will obtain the information.'82 Accordingly, a disclosure to an
independent auditor waives the privilege if the auditor is considered a
potential adversary or a conduit to an adversary. 183 When an opposing
party claims that work product protection was waived-to make
disclosed information available to both parties
in discovery-it will
84
alternatives.
these
of
both
on
proceed
often
Most courts have concluded that disclosure of attorney work product
to independent auditors does not waive the protection, though the results
have been mixed. 185 At least one court has acknowledged that there are
good arguments on both sides of this issue. 186 Disclosures to
independent auditors should generally not cause corporations to waive
work product immunity, and most courts that reached this outcome
properly addressed at least some of the competing policy concerns.
However, the reasoning that guided those outcomes, where courts found
that disclosure did not waive work product immunity, may not yield
proper future outcomes when there is a true cause for finding that
disclosure waives the protection. In other words, the reasoning used by
the non-waiver line of cases is preferable, but incomplete, because the
decisions do not leave room for courts to adequately react when a
genuine adversarial 87
relationship may arise between a client and its
1
auditor.
independent
The split of authority within district courts under the Second Circuit,
where most of the litigation surrounding this issue has taken place,
shows that corporations still face uncertainty.' 88 The recent D.C. Circuit
decision in Deloitte, which sided with the stronger trend from the
182. See Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). Work product protection is waived when disclosure is "inconsistent with the maintenance
of secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary" because this type of disclosure is at odds with
the limited immunity covered by the work product doctrine. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610
F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 235 F.3d
598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
183. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 142-43.
184. See, e.g., id. (analyzing both of the government's theories: potential adversary and

conduit to a potential adversary).
185. See supra Part II.
186. Merrill Lynch, 229 F.R.D. at 446.
187. In Merrill Lynch, the court held that disclosure to the auditor did not waive work
product protection and that there must be a "tangible adversarial relationship," yet it failed to
describe when such a relationship may arise. Id. at 447-48. In Deloitte, the court held that an
adversarial relationship may be found only when a corporation discloses documents to its
auditor that specifically address expected litigation between the client and the auditor. Deloitte,
610 F.3d at 142.
188. See supra Part II.A.
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panoply of district court decisions on this issue within the Second
Circuit, provides an appealing precedent for corporations and allays
some of this uncertainty. But Deloitte went further and applied an
overly narrow standard when it decided whether an auditor becomes a
potential adversary. 189 After Deloitte, the IRS issued an announcement
that reenacted its previous policy of restraint in making requests for
documents otherwise protected under the work product privilege. 190 But
the IRS did not acquiesce to the Deloitte decision. 191 Deloitte leaves
room for the IRS, other government agencies such as the Department of
Justice or the SEC, and certainly private parties, to assert work product
waiver in cases that suggest that an auditor could truly become an
1 92
adversary of its client, despite the decision's narrow standard.
Meanwhile, corporations face continued uncertainty, and government
agencies still have an arrow left in their quiver.
As courts continue to wrestle with this issue, they should fully
consider the competing policy concerns and adequately address the
circumstances at their immediate disposal to determine whether a
corporation did in fact disclose its work product to a potential
adversary, even if that third party is its independent auditor. This Part
offers a case-by-case approach that courts should use to address work
product waiver issues in cases of disclosures to independent auditors
'
suggesting that courts should consider the "nature of the relationship" 191
189. See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Work Product Immunity for Attorney-Created Tax Accrual
Workpapers?: The Aftermath ofUnited States v. Textron, 10 FLA. TAX REv. 503, 560-61 (2011)
("The Court of Appeals in the Deloitte case ... adopted a very narrow view of adversity for
purposes of its waiver analysis.").
190. I.R.S. Announcement 2010-76, 2010-41 I.R.B. 432 (Sept. 24,2010).
191. Jeremiah Coder, Work Product ProtectionStronger After Deloitte, PractitionersSay,
129 TAx NOTES 9 (2010) ("Expanding the IRS's policy of restraint in Announcement 2010-76 is
").
not an informal acquiescence to the government's loss in Deloitte ....
192. Prior to the Deloitte decision and the IRS Announcement, which reinstated its
previous policy of restraint, one commentator suggested that one way to deal with the
conflicting policy concerns implicated by work product waiver claims and the uncertain state of
the law is to encourage the IRS to use more restraint in its document requests. Andrew Golodny,
Lawyers Versus Auditors: Disclosure to Auditors and Potential Waiver of Work-Product
Privilege in United States v. Textron, 61 TAX LAW. 621, 637 (2008). This compromise,
however, still leaves room for uncertainty and inconsistent decisions because private plaintiffs
can still assert that the protection was waived in an attempt to discover otherwise protected
attorney work product that was disclosed to independent auditors.
193. This proposed fact and circumstances test is consistent with the Supreme Court's
framing of the relationship between independent auditors and their clients in United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). There, the Court viewed independent auditors as
"public watchdogs," so viewing the nature of the relationship between an independent auditor
and a disclosing client serves as an appropriate guideline to determine whether the relationship
was adversarial in the context of the Supreme Court's assertion that auditors owe ultimate
allegiance to the investing public. Id.at 818. A "nature of the relationship" test has also been
used to analyze third party standing where a court determines the extent of the stake a third

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 23

between the auditor and the corporate client at the time of the
disclosure. This approach offers a thorough balance of the competing
policy concerns (which courts should always address in their analyses)
and proposes the "nature of the relationship" standard by which courts
can adequately account for true adversarial relationships. Finally, this
Part offers an alternative method of correcting the problem at the source
by proposing a bright-line rule that Congress or appellate courts may
use that would prevent waiver in most cases of disclosure to
independent auditors. The proposed rule would not create a complete
safe harbor from waiver, but would instead allow adequate room for
situations where there could be a genuine adversarial relationship
between corporations and their independent auditors.
A. A Case-by-Case Approach: When IndependentAuditors
Become Adversaries
Until Congress offers an alternative to the Hobson's choice
corporations face from pressures for disclosure imposed by SarbanesOxley, courts should adopt a case-by-case approach that neither erodes
the work product doctrine nor guarantees its protection for every
disclosure made in the course of an audit. Although a case-by-case
approach inherently obviates complete certainty, courts will reach wellreasoned conclusions by thoroughly addressing both sides of the policy
debate outlined in this Part. Moreover, this proposed approach permits
corporations to take the necessary precautions to avoid triggering a
disclosure that would waive the privilege-creating sufficient certainty
for disclosing corporations.
The court in Deloitte, when it decided that the independent auditor
was not a conduit to potential adversaries of the corporation, considered
whether the corporation reasonably expected that the auditor would
maintain confidentiality. 94 In the court's view, a sufficiently strong
confidentiality agreement between a disclosing corporation and its
95
independent auditor provides reasonable assurance of confidentiality.'
In addition, Rule 301 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
imposes a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.' 96 Finally, the court
considered the number of ways the independent auditor could disclose
confidential information: under an obligation to report acts of fraud,
party has
U.S. 947,
194.
195.
196.

in a constitutional challenge. See Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
973 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 142.
Id. See AICPA

PROFESSIONAL

STANDARDS, Code of Professional Conduct § 101.08

(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005) (describing the effect of actual and threatened
litigation on auditor independence).
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under pressure to testify in proceedings brought by the SEC or private
parties, or by forcing the corporation to disclose its confidential tax
analysis in footnotes to the company's publicly issued financial
statements. 197 Nevertheless, these regulations and possible situations
never specifically require disclosure, so the court found that auditor
obligations as "public watchdogs" do not make auditors conduits to the
adversaries of their corporate clients.' 98 Under this guidance,
corporations can simply enter into "sufficiently strong" agreements with
their auditors and expect, with reasonably strong certainty, that they do
not disclose to a conduit or to an adversary when they respond to
auditor inquiries.' 99
The leeway in the "adversary" analysis instead is found when courts
must decide whether, in a particular case of disclosure, an auditor could
be a potential adversary. Accordingly, when deciding whether an
independent auditor could be a potential adversary, courts should apply
the following standard: analyze the nature of the precise relationship
between the corporation and its auditor at the time of the disclosure (if
the parties used disclosures to mutually conduct and conceal fraud, then
this militates in favor of finding waiver).
Before this standard is considered in detail, it is necessary to explain
why courts should not employ a blanket rule of waiver or non-waiver in
cases where work product is disclosed to independent auditors. The
following section outlines the various policy concerns that courts
deciding this issue should always address and offers support for the
flexible fix in Part III.B. This balance of policy concerns supports a
rejection of proposed statutory fixes that would create a bright-line rule
of waiver or non-waiver, and instead justifies a more flexible fix usable
by Congress or an appellate court that wishes to design new precedent.
1. Policy Arguments: Blanket Waiver and Non-Wavier
Rules Are Unfavorable
Courts must always recognize that independent auditors, as
accountants, serve as "public watchdogs" that owe ultimate allegiance
to the investing public. This differs from the role that accountants may
assume as consultants. Sarbanes-Oxley limited the additional roles that
197.

Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 142.

198. Id.
199. Corporations should always enter into confidentiality agreements with their auditors
and should also ensure that when auditors make requests directly to their counsel, the counsel
provides specific restrictions on subsequent disclosure to independent auditors. See United
States v. Hatfield, No. 06-CR-0550 (JS), 2010 WL 183522, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2010)

(holding that work product protection was waived because the auditors were not given specific
restrictions on what work product they could share and did not engage in any discussions about
confidentiality).
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independent auditors may assume in an effort to be sure that
independent auditors fulfill their primary roles as neutral disseminators
of accurate financial information.2 °° Courts that found that waiver
occurred from disclosure to an independent auditor usually compared
the role of an accountant as a consultant with the role of an accountant
as an auditor. 20 1 Unpacking these roles in this manner demonstrates that
independent auditors do not share the same interests with their clients as
accountants that act as consultants.
Courts deciding for and against waiver have acknowledged that
independent auditors and their clients should not have common
litigation interests,20 2 but some have found that other interests, such as a
common interest in creating financial statements that are fairly
presented, can be inferred to show that independent auditors are not
inherently potential adversaries. 20 3 Parties with common business
interests, for example, may nonetheless share work product and still
enjoy the protection. 2° In Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy,
Inc., the court found that "[a] business and its auditor can and should be
aligned insofar as they both seek to prevent, detect, and root out
corporate fraud., 20 5 This provides strong support for the conclusion that
clients and their auditors should not inherently be considered potential
adversaries, despite the strong language in United States v. Arthur
Young & Co. that mandates "total independence from 20the
6 client at all
times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust."
Indeed, finding a blanket rule of waiver in these cases would
eviscerate the work product doctrine and would likely prevent
corporations from making disclosures to the auditor that would
otherwise benefit the investing public. On the other hand, this
presumption should not be steadfastly assumed. Independent auditors
have the power to issue qualified (unfavorable) opinions, or disclaimers
(in which the auditors decline to issue an opinion) over a client's
financial statements if the client declines to disclose requested
information. 207 Issuing a qualified opinion or a disclaimer of an opinion
200. See supra note 6.
201. See, e.g., Hafield,2010 WL 183522, at *1-2.
202. See, e.g., Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 142.
203. E.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegany Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 447 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 448.
206.

465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).

207. See REPORTS ON AUDITED FNANcIAL STATEMENTS, Statements on Auditing Standards
No. 508 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989). An auditor may issue an unqualified
opinion, the most favorable report an auditor may give, if the financial statements fairly and
accurately present the financial position of the company, the results of its operations, and the
changes in its financial position for the period under audit, in conformity with generally
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will likely have adverse effects on the market price of a company's
stock.20 8 In Arthur Young, the Supreme Court suggested that this
pressure would cause corporate management to think twice about
risking unfavorable evaluations of the company's financial2 9statements
just to cover up questionable positions in possible litigation. 0
Consequently, a blanket rule of non-waiver should not be imposed
either. Sometimes independent auditors overstep the bounds intended by
Sarbanes-Oxley. 210 If a blanket rule of non-waiver is instead imposed,
corporations might be protected from liability for fraudulent activity
that an independent auditor ratifies. The Deloitte decision meets in the
middle, yet it narrowly construed the term "adversary" for the purposes
of work product waiver. The D.C. Circuit stated that the question is not
whether the corporation could be the auditor's adversary in any possible
future litigation, but whether the corporation could be the auditor's
adversary in the sort of litigation the disclosed documents address. 2 11
Accordingly, the court found that the documents disclosed to the
auditors contemplated a dispute with the IRS, and not with the auditor;
therefore, the documents would not likely be relevant in any dispute
between the company and its independent auditor.212
This standard is one step closer to finding a proper middle ground
between blanket waiver and blanket non-waiver, which is the most
appropriate approach unless Congress steps in to clarify that the law
should lean one way or the other. But Deloitte's standard focuses on the
content of the document to ascertain its purpose for the waiver issue,
which is an improper method of analysis that narrows the scope of
possible situations in which a later court could find that a disclosure

accepted accounting principles. Id. § 10. Alternatively, the auditor may issue a qualified opinion
if the financial statements are fairly presented except for, or subject to, a departure from
generally accepted accounting principles, a change in accounting principles, or a material
uncertainty. Id. An auditor may issue an adverse opinion if the corporation's financial
statements do not fairly present the financial position, results of operations, or changes in
financial position of the company, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
Id. Moreover, adverse opinions may be issued if an auditor determines that a corporation has
materially misstated certain items on its financial statements. Id. §§ 45-49. Finally, an auditor
may issue a disclaimer of opinion if the auditor is unable to draw a conclusion as to the accuracy

of the corporate financial records. Id. § 10. A disclaimer of opinion usually occurs when
restrictions are imposed on auditors, also known as "scope limitations," which significantly limit
their ability to audit important elements of the financial statements. Id. § 24.
208. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818-19.
209. Id.
210. For example, independent auditors may overstep the bounds of Sarbanes-Oxley by
failing to root out corporation fraud under 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5)(B) (2006), which requires
management to disclose instances of fraud to its independent auditors.
211. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
212. Id.
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waived work product protection. 213 In practice, this standard conforms
adequately to the competing policy concerns addressed in this Part, but
it will miss the mark when auditors can become potential adversaries in
cases of auditor fraud and when the disclosed documents do not directly
address litigation between the corporation and the independent auditor.
As the court in Deloitte stated, an auditor must withdraw in the event
that the corporation and the auditor become directly involved with
litigation, so the auditor should rarely request and receive a document in
which the corporation discusses a suit with that same auditor.2 14 One
possible exception might be complicit fraud in which attorney work
product discusses possible auditor liability, when the auditors then
violate accounting regulations by failing to discover and disclose the
corporate fraud.
As government regulators enforce recent charges on corporations
and culpable individuals for the deception that caused the mortgage
crisis, work product waiver will be inadequately served by the Deloitte
analysis. 2 15 For example, in the event that an independent auditor is
complicit in fraudulent accounting practices, as was alleged against
Ernst & Young (E&Y) for its ratification of Lehman Brothers'
deceptive accounting methods, a court employing Deloitte's standard
would likely fail to recognize this situation as an adversarial
relationship that oversteps the intended protection of the work product
doctrine.
Courts can employ the waiver principle to help government
regulators uncover instances of fraud by following the guidance of
recent courts, which have nevertheless formed a strong trend finding
that waiver does not occur. 2 17 Courts should remain flexible and able to
recognize a situation where an auditor did maintain a relationship with
the client that could result in adversarial tension.
Accordingly, courts should instead adopt a more flexible guideline to
determine whether a corporation enjoyed a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality, so that disclosure to an auditor does not always result in
waiver.
213. See id.
214. Id.; see AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §
101.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005).
215. During 2009, investors filed 55 class action lawsuits in federal court based on
allegations of fraud related to the credit crisis. John Hellerman et al., 2010 Year in Review:
Press Release, STAN. LAW SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 1. This may
likely put pressure on government regulators to also file lawsuits based on allegations of fraud
in federal court, and in some cases independent auditors may have been culpably involved. Cf
Ernst & Young Sued over Lehman: Goingfor the Auditors the Ultimate Target of the Lawsuit
May Be Lehman's Former Bosses, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2011, at 57 [hereinafter Ernst & Young
Sued].

216.
217.

See Ernst & Young Sued, supra note 215.
See supra Part II.A.

KEEP YOUR FRIENDS CLOSE BUT YOUR AUDITORS CLOSER

2. Potential Adversaries: Nature of the Relationship Between the Client
and the Independent Auditor at the Time of Disclosure
Instead of employing the overly narrow standard adopted by
Deloitte, in which a court would consider whether the disclosed
document contemplated litigation between the client and the auditor,
courts should consider the nature of the relationship between the
corporation and its auditor at the time of disclosure. This subsection will
offer guidance and justifications for applying this standard.
The assumption that opposing parties are entitled to "every man's
evidence" underlies the liberal rules of discovery, and every exception
or privilege "presupposes a very real interest to be protected." 218-The
work product doctrine is justified as one such exception, resting on the
belief that a lawyer's ability to prepare for trial without intrusion by an
opposing party furthers the truth-finding process.2 19 The guideline
offered in this Part prevents corporate clients from exploiting the
protections that the work product doctrine offers by encouraging
companies to disclose only attorney work product that is essential to the
audit function. This guideline also prevents corporate clients from
exploiting the work product doctrine by finding that corporations and
their auditors become potential adversaries when the relationship
becomes "substantially impaired" according to the AICPA Code of
Professional Conduct.
Independent auditors typically request disclosures that may contain
protected attorney work product in two categories: (1) evaluations of
220
loss contingencies, and (2) detection of fraud and illegal acts. As long
as courts determine that disclosures were made in furtherance of these
two areas of auditor inquiry, work product immunity should not be
waived based only upon whether the documents themselves
contemplate litigation between the auditor and the client.22 1 Instead,
courts should look to the nature of the relationship between the auditor
and the client at the time the disclosure was made.
Under this approach, courts would not inquire into every possible
dispute that may arise between a corporation and its auditor. Rather,
courts analyzing the nature of the relationship between an auditor and a
corporate client would be able to identify any number of possible
disputes that were extremely likely given the interaction between the
corporate client and the auditor presented by the facts of each case.
218. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950).
219. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
220. See Col6n, supra note 24, at 136-37.
221. This was the standard employed in United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 137
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Using the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct's guidelines, courts
can identify whether any of the situations suggesting auditor impairment
arose, then determine whether the disclosure was at odds with these
guidelines. This would prevent courts from applying overly narrow
standards that might miss disclosures that contravene the protections of
the work product doctrine. It would also provide clear, identifiable areas
where courts can analyze the facts of each case to determine whether a
particular disclosure substantially increases the opportunity that the
information may end up in the hands of adversaries.
In Deloitte, the D.C. Circuit was on the right track when it
recognized that certain situations could merit finding that an
independent auditor was a potential adversary, but it narrowly confined
this to situations where the actual disclosed documents refer to specific
litigation between the client and the auditor.222 This standard is too
narrow, especially in light of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct,
which offers guidelines that suggest situations in which an independent
auditor and a client might be placed in "threatened or actual positions of
material adverse interests by reason of threatened or actual
litigation. ' ' 22 3 The Code of Professional Conduct also lists two other
situations in which auditor involvement can be "impaired," in which
case the AICPA guidelines recommend withdrawal of the auditor from
the engagement. 2 24 Accordingly, courts should reject Deloitte's narrow
standard, which calls for review of the disclosed documents to
determine whether they refer to potential litigation, and instead focus on
the reasons why the disclosures were made to the auditor.
The model case in Part II.D of this Note may be used to illustrate
how a court would use this approach when it must determine whether
the auditor should be considered a potential adversary. In the model
case, the underlying work product is a report disclosed by Linda Brown,
a products liability attorney, discussing the expected outcome of tort
suits. The court would begin by identifying this request as essential to
the auditor's evaluation of loss contingencies. Next, the court might
consider whether the fact that the auditor apparently failed to follow
accounting regulations justifies finding that the relationship would
likely become impaired under the AICPA Standards of Professional
Conduct. 225 Under the AICPA guidelines, the possibility outlined in this
fact pattern is directly addressed.226 The guidelines state that litigation
involving a class action suit naming a corporation and its auditor
222.

See id. at 137, 140, 142.

223.

AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Code of Professional Conduct § 101.08 (Am.

Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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(precisely what occurred to SMI in the model case) does not
automatically impair auditor independence and necessitate auditor
withdrawal from the audit. However, these situations require careful
consideration because adverse227 interests can exist if cross-claims are
filed, alleging fraud by deceit.
This might occur, for example, if SMI's auditor later decided to file
a cross-claim against SMI for indemnification, alleging that the
managers deceived the auditors. Given this likelihood, and the strong
interest in prosecuting collusive manipulation of public financial
a court using the "nature of the relationship" standard
statements,
should find that disclosure was waived. Accordingly, even if a
government regulator brought the case against the corporation and the
independent auditors as defendants (instead of investors), there is strong
justification for also holding that this is a situation where the "nature of
the relationship," based on the collusion, mandates finding that the
disclosure waived work product protection.
One concern may be that corporations should be encouraged to
disclose as much as possible to their independent auditors, and thus a
limit on only essential attorney work product may prevent disclosure of
information or prevent companies from seeking the advice of counsel.
However, auditor regulations provide sufficient incentives for auditors
to request materials that will allow them to issue opinions. 229 As long as
the auditors are in the position to request what they feel is necessary,
corporations will comply or risk an adverse opinion.
Another concern might be that the Deloitte standard offers greater
certainty for disclosing corporations at the time of the disclosure. Under
the Deloitte standard, the corporation would have a clearer
understanding of whether disclosed material addresses possible
litigation involving the auditor, based on the content of the material.23 °
In contrast, under the "nature of the relationship" proposed standard,
courts make the determination based on the attendant facts of the case.
However, if courts use the explicit guidelines mentioned in the AICPA
Code of Professional Conduct, corporations can control what type of
relationships they create to maintain reasonable expectations that they
are not disclosing to "potential adversaries" when they disclose work
product to independent auditors.
This proposed standard is especially useful because it does not
require a comparison with the underlying document to determine
whether the auditor and the client could be potential adversaries. In
227.

Id.

228. The plaintiffs might proceed on a "substantial need" exception, but as discussed in
Part I of this Note, this exception is rarely granted.
229. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
230. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Deloitte, two of the disclosed documents were clearly work product; the
Department of Justice conceded this fact. 231 In future cases, however, an
underlying document may not clearly appear to contain privileged work
product. For example, in United States v. Textron, Inc., the First Circuit
employed the more widely adopted "because of' test, but
reached a
232
result at odds with the majority of courts that used this test.
The court in Textron held that the tax accrual workpapers were not
entitled to work product protection, though most courts that adopt the
"because of' test have found that dual-purpose documents were entitled
to work product protection. 233 Before this dispute reached a rehearing en
banc, the district court held that the documents were protected work
2 34
product; therefore, the court's analysis centered on the waiver issue.
The district court, relying on Pfizer and Merrill Lynch, found that no
waiver occurred.235 If the First Circuit had a different set of facts that
did pass its broader "because of' test, then the waiver issue would have
been addressed, and waiver would have likely been found.
Courts, however, should not use the "because of' test, which itself is
already uncertain following Textron, to lend support for the standard the
D.C. Circuit adopted in Deloitte, in which the court looked at the
underlying disclosed document to determine whether it addressed a
possible adversarial relationship between the corporation and the
auditor. The Textron decision is instructive because it shows that the
"because of' test is still in flux. Further, because waiver is tied so
closely to this issue, the results are bound to be mixed in the event that
the issue is presented again at the circuit level.
Functionally, the standard proposed in this Note proves to be
especially salient because it does not involve looking at the contents of
the disputed materials directly. Looking at the contents would
inherently involve mixing the initial "anticipation of litigation"
determination, for the underlying material, with the analysis of waiver.
These determinations should remain distinct because both address
vastly different policy concerns: the work product tests serve to identify
materials containing the private and personal work efforts of attorneys
made in anticipation of litigation, whereas work product waiver serves
to identify disclosures at odds with the maintenance of secrecy from
adversaries in litigation. 236 A court that decides to employ the broader
"because of' test to grant more material work product protection should
not necessarily broaden its approach to determine whether certain
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 133-34, 135, 139.
577 F.3d 21, 30-32 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010).
Id,

234. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152-54 (D.R.I. 2007).
235.
236.

Id.
See supra Part II.
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disclosures then waive this privilege. Maintaining this analytical
distinction prevents courts from utilizing the circumspect analysis in
Merrill Lynch, where the court bolstered its finding that no waiver
occurred by stating that it in fact takes a broader approach to identify
whether the underlying material is2 3protected work product in the first
place-using the "because of' test.
Accordingly, courts should consider the nature of the relationship
between the auditor and the client. Upon employing this standard,
courts must be sure to clearly separate the initial analysis of whether the
underlying material was protected work product in the first place, from
the subsequent analysis over whether the protection was waived by
disclosure to third party independent auditors. This would involve
looking at the circumstances of the disclosure, such as whether it was
done pursuant to an auditor request related to an evaluation of litigation
reserves, or whether the request was related to possible detection of
fraud. As a result, courts would be able to identify possible situations in
which the reasons for the disclosure may have been fueled by improper
purposes.
Auditors may be pressured to comply in plea bargaining to disclose
documents, despite the professional protections granted through the
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, if the auditor is being criminally
charged. This is exactly what might happen in the event that the charges
against E&Y relating to Lehman Brothers are not settled.238 Charging
the auditors with the crimes is a means to get them to identify corporate
insiders. In this scenario, an auditor seems more like an adversary. The
corporation might argue that it is unfair for the government to assert
waiver in an attempt to usurp the work product privilege. However, this
situation, as well as similar situations involving complicit fraud between
auditors and corporations, creates a strong justification for a departure
from the narrow standard in Deloitte and is more aligned with the
broader standard in Merrill Lynch, which contemplates a "tangible
adversarial relationship."
Congress's aim through its enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley was to
prevent the type of problematic coordination that existed between
of
Enron's corrupt accounting practices, Arthur Andersen's ratification 239
audit.
its
in
issues
critical
of
concealment
further
and
such practices,
In light of this highly criticized conduct, Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted
to position the auditor more in the form of an adversary in relation to its
audited clients, ready to disclose possible instances of corporate fraud in

237.

See Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 447 n.9

(S.D°N.Y. 2004).
238. See Ernst & Young Sued, supra note 215, at 97.
239. See Fass, supra note 17.
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the interest of transparency and public accountability. 24 Accordingly,
this "nature of the relationship" standard applies a reasonable approach
to appropriately broaden the trend of cases that find non-waiver in most
instances of disclosures of attorney work product to independent
auditors. This standard also provides an appropriate amount of certainty,
while allowing room for government agencies to ferret out fraud in
fitting circumstances.
Unless Congress or an appellate court steps in with a bright-line test
to clarify the issue, courts will continue to operate under the approach
that determines whether disclosure substantially increases the chance
that attorney work product will end up in the hands of adversaries. This
Note's proposed standard that considers the "nature of the relationship"
provides a useful solution.
B. Bright-Line Test: Suggested Legislation or Common Law Fix
Recent cases addressing this issue ruled against Medinol and found
that waiver of the work product privilege did not occur upon a
disclosure to independent auditors. 24 1 Yet these courts have not properly
taken into account the possible situations where an auditor can be a
potential adversary or conduit to an adversary. Until one of these factual
situations occurs, corporations will still make disclosures with a small,
but potentially costly, degree of risk. A court that addresses this issue in
the future should reject the guidance in Deloitte, where the court looked
to whether the auditor had a personal stake in the underlying document
to determine whether the auditor was a potential adversary. Instead, a
court facing this issue should employ a more appropriate case-by-case
approach that fully considers whether a disclosing corporation engaged
the auditor in activities that could result in an adversarial relationship
between the auditor and the client.
The Deloitte standard is too rigid because disclosures between
auditors and their clients can almost never amount to waiver under its
guidance. 242 Some might argue that this is necessary to facilitate public
disclosure, in the sense that corporations will more freely disclose
critical information to their auditors if the protection is certain to be
240. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) ("The
independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to [the] investing public. This 'public
watchdog' function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at
all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified
public accountant's interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the
significance of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.").
241. See supra Part II.A.
242. See Lischer, supra note 189, at 560 ("The Court of Appeals in the Deloitte case ...
adopted a very narrow view of adversity for purposes of its waiver analysis.").
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unaffected by waiver, thereby enhancing disclosure to the public. But
this is the goal that Sarbanes-Oxley addressed by creating the PCAOB
and by requiring disclosures to auditors in the first place. 243
" If the best
perceived manner of encouraging full disclosure to the public is through
Sarbanes-Oxley's rigid requirement of disclosure to an independent
auditor, then in the alternative, Sarbanes-Oxley should be amended to
include a waiver provision.
Much would be gained in this uncertain area by creating a bright-line
statutory rule that addresses waiver. Alternatively, this clear rule could
be employed by the next appellate court that rules on this issue. A clear
rule would obviate the need for costly and elaborate inquiry into the
motivations for particular disclosures and the potential for further
disclosures. As one commentator stated, "Whatever minor unfairness
may in some individual case inure to the privilege or protection holder
is more than offset by the attendant greater efficiency in litigation and
the greater ease in assessing the legal consequences of any such
disclosure. ' ,244 Following this appeal to certainty, two commentators
have suggested statutory fixes: one would find that waiver never occurs,
and the other would find that waiver would always occur when
corporations disclose attorney work product to independent auditors as
part of an audit of a company's publicly issued financial statements.245
As discussed in Part III.A, competing concerns would inevitably
conflict with a blanket rule of waiver or non-waiver in cases of
disclosures to independent auditors. A blanket rule of non-waiver, for
instance, might not account for the decision in United States v.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where a university disclosed
documents to a government auditing agency that had the obligation to
disclose the documents to a potential adversary. 246 Accordingly, a
statutory or common law bright-line rule with flexibility is most
appropriate.
Sarbanes--Oxley already contains a safe harbor for documents and

243. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 16.
244. See EPSTEIN, supranote 24, at 1061.
245. Compare Col6n, supra note 24, at 143-44 ("Whenever an organization produces or
discloses documents or information to its independent auditors for the purpose of completing an
audit of the organization's financial statements, and such documents or information are subject
to the protection provided by the work product doctrine, such production or disclosure shall not
constitute a waiver of the work product protection as to any persons other than the independent
auditors, in any civil or criminal proceeding in any federal court."), with EpsmIN, supra note 24,
at 1063 ("Anything disclosed to a public accountant in conjunction with the preparation of
financial statements to be made available to shareholders and the investing public necessarily
implies a sufficiently broad dissemination to require a waiver of any work-product
protection.").
246. 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997).
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information disclosed to the PCAOB as part of an investigation. 247 The
information disclosed to the PCAOB under an investigation required
under Sarbanes-Oxley "shall be confidential and privileged as an
evidentiary matter (and shall not be subject to civil discovery or other
legal process)., 248 Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain similar language,
however, when it requires management to make disclosures of instances
of fraud to its independent auditors. 249 In response, Congress should
amend Sarbanes-Oxley by adding a provision that provides waiver for
certain disclosures to independent auditors. The provision might state:
"A corporation does not waive attorney work product protection when it
makes disclosures to independent auditors as part of an ongoing audit of
the corporation's public financial statements, as long as the disclosures
are reasonably necessary to comply with the demands of the
independent auditor according to accounting regulations and securities
laws."
By limiting the scope of protected disclosures to those that are
"reasonably necessary," all disclosures are protected as long as they are
made pursuant to auditor requests to aid in the evaluation of loss
contingencies, or to aid in an auditor's attempt to detect fraud or illegal
acts. These are the required inquiries that auditors must make, so they
would certainly be "reasonably necessary." 250 Adoption of this rule by
Congress to create uniformity, or by an appellate court to solidify the
current trend of federal cases that find non-waiver, would establish
much-needed certainty in this area of the law. 2 51 Moreover, this rule
would eliminate the need for elaborate briefing and discovery when
courts must inquire into whether a potential likelihood of further
disclosure to adversaries exists. Most importantly, this rule would
eliminate legal obstacles as corporations cooperate with their
independent auditors, and provide greater certainty as corporations
assess the consequences of these disclosures.
CONCLUSION

Courts have repeatedly recognized that auditors and their clients are
at odds, because auditors owe ultimate allegiance to the investing

247.
248.

See 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2006).
Id.

249. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying note 207.
251. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege,
or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is
little better than no privilege at all.").
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public.252 Against this backdrop, courts have more often found that
disclosure to independent auditors does not waive work product
protection, with Deloitte being the most recent decision on this issue at
the federal circuit level. In these cases, courts have continuously failed
to provide a workable standard that properly accounts for circumstances
that may justify a finding of waiver. Courts should instead apply the
"nature of the relationship" approach established in this Note to
appropriately balance the concerns of transparency and certainty
plaguing this uncertain area of the law. This proposed approach
involves balancing the policy concerns and applying a standard that
considers the nature of the relationship between the independent auditor
and the disclosing corporation.
Alternatively, this Note offers a bright-line fix that Congress or an
appellate court may adopt to reconcile the competing policy concerns
and provide clarity in this area of the law. Striking this balance creates
much-needed certainty in this area of the law253 because corporations
are able to adequately protect themselves by using confidentiality
agreements and by pressuring their audit committees to limit the scope
of tax involvement provided by their audit firms. Nevertheless,
government agencies and plaintiffs seeking material that falls outside of
work product protections will not be shut out by corporations'
overreaching use of Hickman's principles of privilege.

252. In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4584-RFP (FW), 1986 WL 53402, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) ("While disclosure to one with a common interest under a guarantee of
confidentiality does not necessarily waive the protection . . . the relationship between public
accountant and client is at odds with such a guarantee because the public accountant has
responsibilities to creditors, stockholders, and the investing public which transcend the
relationship with the client.").
253. Id.
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